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Abstract
In this paper, we study the problem of resource allocation as well as pricing in the context of
Internet of things (IoT) networks. We provide a novel pricing model for IoT services where all the
parties involved in the communication scenario as well as their revenue and cost are determined. We
formulate the resource allocation in the considered model as a multi-objective optimization problem
where in addition to the resource allocation variables, the price values are also optimization variables.
To solve the proposed multi-objective optimization problem, we use the scalarization method which
gives different Pareto optimal solutions. We solve the resulting problems using the alternating approach
based on the successive convex approximation (SCA) method which converges to a local solution with
few iterations. We also consider a conventional approach where each entity tries to maximize its own
revenue independently. Simulation results indicate that by applying the proposed joint framework, we
can increase the total revenue compared to the conventional case while providing an almost complete
fairness among the players. This is while the conventional approach fails to provide such a fairness.
Index Terms– IoT, Resource Allocation, Pricing, SCMA, HetNets.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
Internet of Things (IoT) is a framework that allows billions of smart devices to be connected to
the Internet [1]. Such devices are able to operate and transmit data to other systems with minimal
or without any human interaction. The development of IoT has greatly influenced many areas,
and many IoT applications have been implemented to improve quality of life in different aspects
Mohammad Moltafet is with Center for Wireless Communication (CWC), University of Oulu, Oulu, Finland. Atefeh Rezaei,
Nader Mokari, and Hamid Saeedi are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Tarbiat Modares University,
Tehran, Iran. Mohammad R. Javan is with the Department of Electrical and Robotics Engineering, Shahrood University, Shahrood,
Hossein Pishro-Nik is with University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, USA.
March 8, 2019 DRAFT
ar
X
iv
:1
90
3.
02
92
8v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  7
 M
ar 
20
19
2such as health care, transportation, and manufacturing [2]. There are different business models
of wireless network virtualization which are described in [3] as two-level and four-level models.
In two-level model, mobile network operators (MNO) and service provider (SP) act as logical
players after wireless network virtualization. All of the infrastructures and physical resources are
operated by MNOs based on virtualization decisions. SPs operate on virtual resources to offer
end-to-end services to end users. In four-level model, the roles of MNO and SP are decoupled
into more specialized tasks, i.e., MNO consists of InP and mobile virtual network provider
(MVNP), and SP consists of mobile virtual network operator (MVNO) and SP where MVNO
assigns the virtual resources to SPs and SP concentrates on providing services to its end users
based on MVNOs decisions. In this paper, the MNO becomes InP and SPs will create and
deploy the virtual resource to provide end-to-end services based on two-level model. The core
of most IoT systems contains smart wireless sensors that can collect data from the environment
and convey such data to the central controllers, referred to as IoT service provider (ISP), for
further processing [1]. The entity that owns such sensors is referred to as the sensor device
owner (SDO). In addition to SDO and ISP, we can generally consider 4 other essential units:
infrastructure providers (InPs), the regulatory, power supplier, and end users. InP provides the
required infrastructures and equipments for the communications of different ISPs and lends
bandwidth to them, regulatory lends bandwidth to different InPs, and power supplier provides
the necessary electrical power in base stations (BS) and sensors. Finally, the ISP processes the raw
data transmitted by sensors and sells them to end users. As all of these mentioned entities in an
IoT network have their own technical and financial interests, reaching a financial resource sharing
agreement among them is usually a challenging task. Moreover, most small SDO’s and ISPs may
not have enough knowledge on the technical and financial details of the service provided by
the large InPs and may be billed by the InP’s at unreasonable rates. The lack of a transparent
market and solid pricing model is one of the main barriers that prevent IoT from becoming
pervasive. Therefore, a solid trading/pricing model is necessary to regulate such deals among
InPs, ISPs, SDO, and end users. Moreover, IoT in fifth generation (5G) network is required to
be able support massive machine type communication. Massive machine type communication
requires enormous amounts of connectivity capability and high spectral efficiency.
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There are a number of works in wireless networking literature that use pricing methods to
model the trade-offs among different entities [4], [5]. Examples include secondary and primary
operators in cognitive radio networks [6], device to device (D2D) communications [7], and dif-
ferent base stations in heterogeneous networks [8]. The existing literature focuses on bandwidth
as the resource to be traded [9].
In D2D communication, user equipments transmit data signals to each other over a direct link
using the cellular resources rather than the BS to improve bandwidth efficiency. In fact, existing
cellular users can sustain their network resources by switching to the D2D mode. Therefore,
there must be some incentive or reward for the D2D users to make them interested to do
so. This requires proper pricing strategies for operators to obtain maximum possible profit as
shown in [10]–[13]. In a cognitive radio network, the primary cellular network owns the licensed
spectrum while the secondary users attempt to dynamically utilize the spectrum. In most cases,
such dynamic occupation requires users to pay for the services they get from the primary network
through direct billing or by serving as primary users’ (PU) relays. Thus, the spectrum becomes
a special kind of commodity in a CRN [14]. Consequently, a large amount of research has been
done to provide different pricing strategies to accommodate efficient spectrum sharing [15]–[23].
The idea of heterogeneous networks in which low-cost small cells (e.g., microcells, picocells, and
femtocells) with small coverage areas and low transmission powers are deployed is a promising
one for improving the efficiency of spectrum utilization in cellular networks. In this regard,
pricing schemes have been considered in [24]–[31].
Few papers in the literature have considered pricing schemes for resources other than spectrum.
In D2D communications, power has been considered as a subject of trading in [32]. In [33] a D2D
communication framework is considered in which the authors design a power-pricing framework
based on the principle of the Stackelberg game. In [34], relay servers are a subject of pricing
where sellers offer cooperative services at the cost of resources such as power by way of auction.
As far as pricing in IoT is concerned, only few works exist in the literature [35]–[39]. As
a simple market, [35] investigates the pricing scheme in a business model of IoT with three
participants: multiple sensing data owners, service providers, and users. With similar market
components, [36] proposes an economic model in big data and IoT in which the authors use
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data. Then, using a Stackelberg game, the optimal raw data selling price is obtained. Service
management of an IoT device has been investigated in [37] where the Markov decision process
is used to model an optimization framework in order to obtain an optimal policy for the device
owner. This policy considers energy transfer and bid acceptance, and attempts to maximize the
reward, defined as the revenue from a winning bid and the costs paid for energy transfer. The
authors of [39] consider a cloud based system including IoT subscriber and propose a threshold
based approach to decide the pricing and allocation of virtual machines to sequentially arriving
requests in order to maximize the revenue of the cloud service provider over a finite time horizon.
The authors of [40] propose a hierarchical mobile edge computing architecture based on the
LTE advanced networks. They study two time scale mechanisms to allocate the computing and
communications resources. In the computing resources allocation, they consider an auction-based
pricing model to maximize the utility of the service provider where the price of each virtual
machine is updated at the beginning of each frame. To solve this problem, they apply a heuristic
algorithm. Moreover, they propose a centralized optimal solution based on Lagrange multipliers
for the bandwidth allocation. The authors of [41] consider a fog computing based system as
an appropriate choice to provide low latency services. The considered network consists of a
few data service operators each of which controls several fog nodes. The fog nodes provide
the required data service to a set of subscribers. They formulate a Stackelberg game to study
the pricing model for the data service operators as well as the resource allocation problem
for the subscribers. They proposed a many-to-many matching game to investigate the pairing
problem between data service operators and fog nodes. Moreover, they applied another layer of
many-to-many matching between the paired fog nodes and serving data service subscribers.
Despite its necessity, there is no pricing platform in the IoT literature that can comprehensively
address the idea of resource sharing/trading which can happen at multiple levels. Motivated by
the aforementioned discussion, the objective of this paper is to provide an end to end dynamic
pricing and power and subcarrier allocation framework in IoT systems that facilitates reaching
an agreement between the network elements and in particular, SDO, InPs, ISPs, and end users,
and to create transparency in such agreements.
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To address the conflicting interests of different players, we have to take into account each
entity’s objective. Consequently, there are multiple objectives in the network design process
which should be optimized simultaneously. Since we have both integer and continuous variables,
in order to jointly maximize the revenues of major players in the proposed pricing model, we
use the multi-objective approach which is a powerful tool that can address such a scenario.
The novelty of the proposed model is two-fold:
• A novel comprehensive framework including all the major players and different levels of
resource sharing is provided. To the best of our knowledge, no prior work exists that
addresses this complex and multilevel pricing structure of IoT systems.
• To solve the proposed end to end optimization problem, several tools including multi-
objective optimization, convex optimization and relaxation methods are combined in the
framework of wireless communications.
We evaluate the performance of the proposed model for different values of the network
parameters using simulations. Moreover, we compare the performance of the proposed algorithm
to the conventional approach, in which resource allocation and pricing are disjointly performed
by each IoT player. From simulations, we can find out that the proposed joint approach leads to
much more fairness than the conventional one as the values of the utility functions of involving
players are much closer to each other than those of conventional approach.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In Section II, the system model and the pricing
scheme are presented. In Section III, problem formulation is provided. Solution of the proposed
problem is provided in Section V and simulation results are in Section VIII. Finally, the paper
is concluded in Section IX.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network Model
Consider a scenario with U users, each of which belongs to one ISP and acts as an IoT service
consumer, and I InPs, where InP i has Bi BSs. On the other hand, there are Sbi sensors in the
coverage area of BS bi who sell the raw data to ISPs. Also each InP framework contains one
macro base station (MBS) and few femto base stations (FBSs). In this paper, we focus on both
March 8, 2019 DRAFT
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Fig. 1: Uplink transmission from sensors to BSs.
the uplink and downlink transmission of raw data which is based on frequency division duplex
(FDD). The uplink transmission of raw data is the transmission from sensors to BSs which is
shown at Fig. 1. The downlink transmission is the transmission of processed data from BSs to
users which is shown at Fig. 2. The data processing is performed at the private cloud of each
ISP1 which is connected to all BSs. We denote the set of InPs by I = {1, 2, . . . , I}, set of BSs in
InP i by Bi = {1, 2, . . . , Bi}, and set of sensors by S =
⋃
bi∈Bi
Sbi , where Sbi is the set of sensors
in cell bi whose cardinality is Sbi . Besides, there are U users with the set of U = {1, 2, . . . , U},
each of which can be associated to only one BS in the network. Moreover, each user is served
by one ISP. The set of ISPs is denoted by V = {1, 2, . . . , V }. Furthermore, the set of users
served by ISP v is denoted by Kv. Hence, we have U =
⋃
v∈V
Kv. The frequency bandwidth of
downlink and uplink wireless channels in each InP i are denoted by WDni and W
Up
i , respectively.
We assume that different InPs use non-overlapping bandwidth. Within each InPi, the bandwidth
is divided between downlink and uplink transmission, denoted by WDni and W
Up
i , respectively.
These available spectrum are divided into Ni and Mi subcarriers, respectively. It is assumed that
each subcarrier has bandwidth of WS. The set of downlink and uplink subcarriers in InP i are
indicated by Ni = {1, 2, . . . , Ni} and Mi = {1, 2, . . . ,Mi}, respectively. We utilize the SCMA
1Note that in our model, the whole infrastructure, provided by multiple InPs, is virtually divided into several virtual networks
over each of which an ISP provides its services. In this context, the ISPs can be considered as MVNOs.
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Fig. 2: Downlink transmission from BSs to users.
technique which is one of the main candidates for 5G multiple access techniques [42]–[44].
We assume that the set of downlink and uplink codebooks are shown by DCi = {1, . . . , Ci}
and UCi = {1, . . . , C ′i}, respectively, where Ci and C ′i are the number of downlink and uplink
codebooks, respectively. Moreover, the mapping between downlink subcarriers and codebooks
is shown by qcin , where q
ci
n = 1 if codebook ci consists of subcarrier n, and otherwise q
ci
n = 0.
In a same way, for uplink case we define q′c
′
i
m to show the mapping between uplink subcarriers
and codebooks. It should be noted that for both uplink and downlink cases, we assume that the
mapping between codebooks and subcarriers is known and fixed. Let pcibi,u denote the downlink
transmit power of BS bi ∈ Bi to user u on codebook ci ∈ DCi, and p′c
′
i
bi,sbi
denotes the uplink
transmit power of sensor sbi to BS bi on codebook c
′
i. The channel gain between BS bi and user
u on subcarrier n, and between BS bi and sensor sbi on subcarrier m are determined by h
n
bi,u
and
hmbi,sbi
, respectively. The codebook assignment indicators are expressed by ρcibi,u, ρ
′c′i
bi,sbi
∈ {0, 1}.
Note that pcibi,u is assigned to subcarrier n based on a given proportion 0 ≤ λbin,ci ≤ 1, indicated
based on codebook design which satisfies
∑
n∈Ci λ
bi
n,ci
= 1 where Ci is the set of subcarriers
in codebook ci. In a same way, p
′c′i
bi,sbi
is assigned to subcarrier m based on a given proportion
λ′bim,ci . The definitions of all variables are summarized in Table I.
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8TABLE I: NOTATIONS
Notation Description LPower,BS [LPower,BSbi ]
φInP,Poweri Income of InP i from lending power to ISPs p
BS [pcibi,u]
φInP,BWi income of InP i from lending spectrum to ISPs and sensors p
Sens [p
c′i
bi,sbi
]
ψInP,Poweri Cost of InP i for buying power from power suppliers ρ
BS [ρcibi,u]
ψInP,BWi Cost of buying bandwidth from regulatory with unit price C
BW
i ρ
Sens [ρ
′c′i
bi,sbi
]
ψISP,Powerv Cost of buying power from InPs at ISP v LBW [LBWi ]
ΦInPtot Total revenue of InPs in the network LSens,Data [LSens,Datav,sbi ]
ψISP,BWv cost of buying bandwidth from InPs at ISP v LUp,Rate [LUp,Ratesbi ]
ψISP,datav Price of buying the raw data from sensors at each ISP v LDn,Rate [LDn,Ratev ]
φISP,ratev Income of ISP v originating from the data service α [αsbi ,u]
φISP,datav Income of ISP v from selling the processed data to users LReserv,User [LReserv,Userv,u ]
qcin q
ci
n = 1 if codebook ci consists of subcarrier n, qcin = 0 otherwise I Set of InPs
q
′c′i
m q
′c′i
m = 1 if codebook c′i consists of subcarrier m, q
ci
m = 0 otherwise Bi Set of BSs in InP i
pcibi,u Downlink transmit power of BS bi ∈ Bi to user u on codebook ci S Set of sensors
p
′c′i
bi,sbi
Uplink transmit power of sensor sbi to BS bi on codebook c
′
i Sbi Set of sensors in cell bi
hnbi,u Channel gain between BS bi and user u on subcarrier n U Set of users
hmbi,sbi
Channel gain between BS bi and sensor sbi on subcarrier m V Set of ISPs
ρcibi,u Downlink codebook assignment Ni Set of downlink subcarriers
ρ
′c′i
bi,sbi
Uplin codebook assignment Mi Set of uplink subcarriers
γcibi,u SINR at user u from BS bi on codebook ci DCi Set of downlink codebooks
rcibi,u Data rate at user u from BS bi on codebook ci UCi Set of uplink codebooks
γ
c′i
bi,sbi
SINR from sensor sbi to BS bi on subcarrier m Φ
InP
i Revenue of InP i
r
c′i
bi,sbi
Data rate at BS bi from sensor sbi on codebook c
′
i Φ
Sens
sbi
Revenue of each sensor sbi
Pmaxbi Maximum allowable transmit power of each BS bi Φ
Sens
tot Total revenue of sensors
P Batsbi
Maximum allowable transmit power of each sensor sbi Φ
ISP
v Revenue of each ISP v
RminDn,v Minimum sum data rate of users owned by ISP v Φ
ISP
tot Total revenue of ISPs
RminUp,sbi
Minimum required data rate at each sensor sbi for uplink ψ
ISP,Uplink
v Paid money from ISP v to SDO
φUser,datau Reward of user u for IoT service
ψUser,rateu Received data rate by users which is offered by ISP v
The received SINR at user u from BS bi on codebook ci is given by
γcibi,u =
ρcibi,u
∑
n∈Ni q
ci
n λ
bi
n,ci
pcibi,u|hnbi,u|2
Icibi,u + (σ
ci
bi,u
)2
, (1)
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Icibi,u =
∑
b′i∈Bi/{bi}
∑
u′∈U
∑
n∈Ni
ρcib′i,u′
qcin λ
b′i
n,cip
ci
b′i,u′
|hnb′i,u|
2. (2)
Accordingly, the data rate at user u from BS bi on codebook ci is formulated by rcibi,u = log2(1+
γcibi,u). The uplink SINR from sensor sbi to BS bi on subcarrier m can be expressed by
γ
c′i
bi,sbi
=
ρ
′c′i
bi,sbi
∑
m∈Mi q
′m
bi
λ′bin,c′ip
′c′i
bi,sbi
|hmbi,sbi |
2
I
′c′i
bi,sbi
+ (σ
′c′i
bi,sbi
)2
, (3)
where I ′c
′
i
bi,sbi
is given by
I
′c′i
bi,sbi
=
∑
b′i∈Bi/{bi}
∑
s′
b′
i
∈Sbi
∑
m∈Mi
ρ
′c′i
b′i,s
′
b′
i
q
c′i
mλ
′b′i
m,c′i
p
′c′i
b′i,s
′
b′
i
|hmbi,s′b′
i
|2. (4)
The received data rate at BS bi from sensor sbi on codebook c
′
i is thus formulated by r
c′i
bi,sbi
=
log2(1 + γ
c′i
bi,sbi
). The following two constraints ensure that each user selects one BS in the
network:
ρcibi,u + ρ
c′′
i′
b′
i′ ,u
≤ 1,∀i, i′ ∈ I, i′ 6= i, bi ∈ Bi, b′i′ ∈ Bi′ , u ∈ U , ci ∈ DCi, c′′i′ ∈ DCi′ , (5)
ρcibi,u + ρ
c′′′i
b′i,u
≤ 1,∀i ∈ I, bi, b′i ∈ Bi, b′i 6= bi, u ∈ U , ci, c′′′i ∈ DCi. (6)
In SCMA, each subcarrier can at most be reused K times, therefore, the following constraints
are enforced for downlink and uplink, respectively:∑
bi∈Bi
∑
u∈U
∑
ci∈DCi
ρcibi,uq
ci
n ≤ K, ∀i ∈ I, n ∈ Ni, (7)
∑
bi∈Bi
∑
sbi∈Si
∑
c′i∈UCi
ρ
′c′i
bi,sbi
q
′c′i
m ≤ K, ∀i ∈ I,m ∈Mi. (8)
Maximum allowable transmit power of each BS bi and sensor sbi are denoted by P
max
bi
and
P Batsbi
, respectively. Hence, we have∑
u∈U
∑
ci∈Ci
ρcibi,up
ci
bi,u
≤ Pmaxbi ,∀i ∈ I, bi ∈ Bi, (9)
∑
c′i∈UCi
ρ
c′i
bi,sbi
p
c′i
bi,sbi
≤ P Batsbi , ∀i ∈ I, bi ∈ Bi, sbi ∈ Sbi . (10)
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Fig. 3: IoT Pricing Scheme.
According to the different user rate requirements of various ISPs, we have the following minimum
required data rate constraints as:∑
i∈I
∑
bi∈Bi
∑
ci∈DCi
rcibi,u ≥ RminDn,v,∀v ∈ V , u ∈ Kv, (11)
where RminDn,v is the minimum sum data rate of users owned by ISP v. In the same way, we have
a minimum data rate constraint for each sensor as:∑
ci∈UCi
r
c′i
bi,sbi
≥ RminUp,sbi ,∀bi ∈ Bi, sbi ∈ Sbi , (12)
where RminUp,sbi is the minimum required data rate at each sensor sbi for uplink transmission.
B. Pricing Scheme
In the proposed pricing model, each sensor sells its raw sensed data to ISPs. In other words,
each ISP collects data from different sensors. Then, ISPs perform a processing based on the
determined sets of collected data and sell it to users. Fig. 3 illustrates the proposed pricing
model of the considered system. Based on Fig. 3, there are four major players in the proposed
DRAFT March 8, 2019
11
IoT pricing scheme: InPs, sensors, ISPs and users. In the following, we present the pricing model
of each player.
1) InPs: Each InP leases power and bandwidth from a power supplier and regulatory, respec-
tively, and lends them to ISPs. In addition, each InP i lends its bandwidth to the set of sensors
owned by BSs in Bi. Assume that LPower,BSbi let the unit of price of power consumption at BS bi,
per Watt. The income of InP i from lending power to ISPs can be obtained as
φInP,Poweri =
∑
bi∈Bi
∑
u∈U
∑
ci∈DCi
LPower,BSbi ρ
ci
bi,u
pcibi,u. (13)
Let LBWi denote the unit price for lending downlink and uplink transmission bandwidths, per Hz,
to ISPs and sensors. Therefore, the income of InP i from lending spectrum to ISPs and sensors
are given by
φInP,BWi =
∑
bi∈Bi
∑
u∈U
∑
ci∈DCi
∑
n∈Ni
qcin L
BW
i ρ
ci
bi,u
WS+ (14)
∑
bi∈Bi
∑
sbi∈Sbi
∑
c′i∈UCi
∑
m∈Mi
q′mbi L
BW
i ρ
c′i
bi,sbi
WS.
The cost of InP i for buying power from power suppliers with a unit price CPower,Sup (per Watt)
is obtained by
ψInP,Poweri =
∑
bi∈Bi
∑
u∈U
∑
ci∈Ci
ρcibi,up
ci
bi,u
CPower,Sup,∀i ∈ I, (15)
and the cost of buying bandwidth from regulatory with unit price CBWi (per Hz) can be formulated
by
ψInP,BWi = W
Dn
i C
BW
i +W
Up
i C
BW
i ,∀i ∈ I. (16)
The revenue of InP i is thus given by
ΦInPi = φ
InP,Power
i + φ
InP,BW
i − ψInP,Poweri − ψInP,BWi . (17)
Hence, the total revenue of InPs in the network is formulated as ΦInPtot =
∑
i∈I Φ
InP
i .
2) Sensors: Each sensor sbi has a reservation wage cost C
Sens,Reserv
sbi
to obtain the raw data.
Moreover, it leases power from the power supplier and bandwidth from InPs with units price
CPower,Sup (per Watt) and LBWi (per Hz), respectively, to sell the raw data with the price L
Sens,Data
v,sbi
which is offered by ISP v to sensor sbi in uplink transmission to ISPs. In doing so, the uplink
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data rate of each sensor sbi is the income of the sensor with unit of price L
Up,Rate
sbi
(1/bps).
Accordingly, the revenue of each sensor sbi can be obtained by
ΦSenssbi
=
∑
v∈V
min{
∑
u∈Kv
αsbi ,u, 1}LSens,Datav,sbi +
∑
v∈V
∑
c′i∈UCi
min{
∑
u∈Kv
αsbi ,u, 1}r
c′i
bi,sbi
LUp,Ratesbi
(18)
−min{
∑
u∈U
αsbi ,u, 1}CSens,Reservsbi −
∑
c′i∈UCi
ρ
c′i
bi,sbi
p
c′i
bi,sbi
CPower,Sup −
∑
c′i∈UCi
∑
m∈Mi
q′mbi ρ
c′i
bi,sbi
WSL
BW
i ,
where the binary indicator αsbi ,u ∈ {0, 1} takes value 1 when the raw data of sensor sbi is used
in the processing data of user u at the cloud of ISP. Note that each ISP buys the data of sensor
sbi at most once. The total revenue of sensors is thus given by Φ
Sens
tot =
∑
sbi∈Sbi Φ
Sens
sbi
.
3) ISPs: Each ISP buys power and downlink bandwidth from InP with unit price LPower,BSbi
and LBWi , respectively. Moreover, it leases the raw data of sensors with price L
Sens,Data
v,sbi
and gives
money to sensors for their uplink data rate with the unit price LUp,Ratesbi . The income of each ISP
is composed of two components. Firstly, they get money for their downlink data rate servicing to
users with the unit of price LDn,Ratev (per bit/s). Secondly, they lend their processed data to users.
The price of the processed data which is served to user u from ISP v is QuLReserv,Userv,u , where
Qu = q log(1 +
I∑
i=1
∑
bi∈Bi
∑
sbi
∈Sbi
αsbi
,u
I∑
i=1
∑
bi∈Bi
Sbi
) is the service quality function of a set of sensors whose data
is used by user u [4], and LReserv,Userv,u is the maximum reservation price that ISP v takes from
user u. In addition, q is a sensing quality of player that is used to tune service quality received
by the users. In doing so, the income of ISP v originating from the data service given to the its
subscribing users is given by
φISP,ratev =
∑
i∈I
∑
bi∈Bi
∑
u∈Kv
∑
ci∈DCi
∑
n∈Ni
qcin L
Dn,Rate
v WSr
ci
bi,u
. (19)
Moreover, the income of ISP v from selling the processed data to users in Kv is obtained by
φISP,datav =
∑
u∈Kv QuL
Reserv,User
v,u . The cost of buying power from InPs at ISP v is given by
ψISP,Powerv =
∑
i∈I
∑
bi∈Bi
∑
u∈Kv
∑
ci∈DCi
LPower,BSbi ρ
ci
bi,u
pcibi,u, (20)
and the cost of buying bandwidth from InPs at ISP v is given by
ψISP,BWv =
∑
i∈I
∑
bi∈Bi
∑
u∈Kv
∑
ci∈DCi
∑
n∈Ni
qcin L
BW
i ρ
ci
bi,u
WS. (21)
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The price of buying the raw data from sensors at each ISP v can be formulated by
ψISP,datav =
∑
sbi∈Sbi
min{
∑
u∈Kv
αsbi ,u, 1}LSens,Datav,sbi . (22)
Moreover, each ISP v gives money to SDO for their uplink data rates with the total price of
ψISP,Uplinkv =
∑
i∈I
∑
bi∈Bi
∑
sbi∈Sbi
min{
∑
u∈Kv
αsbi ,u, 1}r
c′i
bi,sbi
LUp,Ratesbi
. (23)
The revenue of each ISP v is thus formulated as follows:
ΦISPv = φ
ISP,rate
v + φ
ISP,data
v − ψISP,Powerv − ψISP,BWv − ψISP,datav − ψISP,Uplinkv . (24)
Therefore, the total revenue of ISPs is given by ΦISPtot =
∑
v∈V Φ
ISP
v .
4) Users: Each user is willing to achieve the high quality IoT and high data rate services with
low power and spectrum consumption. Therefore, for each user, rewards and costs are modeled
as follows:
• Reward 1: IoT service (the processed data) is received by users with unit price CReserv,Useru .
Therefore, reward of user u for IoT service is given by
φUser,datau = QuC
Reserv,User
u ,∀u ∈ Kv. (25)
• Cost 1: The received data rate by users which is offered by ISP v with unit cost LDn,Ratev is
given by
ψUser,rateu =
∑
i∈I
∑
bi∈Bi
∑
ci∈DCi
∑
n∈Ni
qcin L
Dn,Rate
v WSr
ci
bi,u
,∀u ∈ Kv. (26)
• Cost 2: IoT service price at user u with unit cost LReserv,Userv,u which is offered by ISP v to
user u, can be obtained by QuLReserv,Userv,u , ∀u ∈ Kv.
The revenue of each user u ∈ Kv is formulated as follows:
ΦUseru = φ
User,data
u − ψUser,rateu −QuLReserv,Userv,u ,∀u ∈ Kv. (27)
Therefore, the total revenue of users is obtained by ΦUsertot =
∑
u∈U Φ
User
u .
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III. PROPOSED PRICING MODEL
In this paper, we aim to design a joint uplink/downlink data delivery policy with BS selection
at users and determine the efficient value of pricing units offered by each player. Moreover, we
obtain the efficient raw data subset selection for processing the collected raw data for each user.
Let us denote p = [pBS,pSens], pBS = [pcibi,u], p
Sens = [p
c′i
bi,sbi
], ρ = [ρBS,ρSens], ρBS = [ρcibi,u],
ρSens = [ρ
′c′i
bi,sbi
], LPower,BS = [LPower,BSbi ], L
BW = [LBWi ], L
Sens,Data = [LSens,Datav,sbi
], LUp,Rate = [LUp,Ratesbi ],
LDn,Rate = [LDn,Ratev ], α = [αsbi ,u], L
Reserv,User = [LReserv,Userv,u ], L = [L
Power,BS,LBW,LSens,Data,
LUp,Rate,LDn,Rate,LReserv,User]. Since we have both integer and continuous variables, in order to
jointly maximize the revenues of the different players, we use the multi-objective approach. The
multi-objective optimization problem of the proposed system model is formulated as
max
ρ,p,L,α
{ΦISPtot ,ΦInPtot ,ΦSenstot ,ΦUsertot }, s.t. : (5)-(12). (28)
The proposed optimization problem in (28) is intractable. To tackle this issue, we adopt the
scalarization method. By using this method, a multi-objective function can be transformed into
a simple, tractable, and single objective function [45]–[47]. Note that there are many cases in
the scalarization methods resulting in different Pareto optimal solutions. The result of solution
of each single objective problem forms a point of Pareto boundary. In the following, we exploit
two approaches within the scalarization method, namely, max-min and weighted-one algorithms,
to solve the multi-objective optimization problem. The main reasons behind selection of these
methods are that the weighted-one is very simple and the max-min method achieves the best
fairness in the system. For more clarification please refer to Appendix A.
A. Max-Min Approach
ISPs, InPs, and SDO are three players which work together to provide IoT services for end
users. In this approach, our goal is to maximize the fairness index among these three players.
Consequently, our max-min optimization problem is formulated as follows:
max
ρ,p,L,α
min
ISP,InP,Sens,
{ΦISPtot ,ΦInPtot ,ΦSenstot }+ ΦUsertot , s.t. : (5)-(12). (29)
B. Weight-One Approach
In this approach, our goal is to maximize the summation of weighted utilities of ISPs, InPs,
sensors, and users. The max-min optimization problem is formulated as follows:
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max
ρ,p,L,α
∑
v∈V
ωISPv Φ
ISP
v +
∑
u∈U
ωUseru Φ
User
u +
∑
i∈I
ωInPi Φ
InP
i +
∑
i∈I
∑
bi∈Bi
∑
sbi∈Sbi
ωSenssbi
ΦSenssbi
(30a)
s.t. (5)-(12).
where ωISPv , ω
User
u , ω
InP
i and ω
Sens
sbi
are the weights tuned based on the priority of ΦISPv , Φ
User
u , Φ
InP
i
and ΦSenssbi , respectively.
IV. CONVENTIONAL APPROACH IN IOT PRICING
Based on a conventional approach, each player by considering a minimum utility requirement
for the other players maximizes its utility. Then, the calculated results of its corresponding price
variables are reported to a central unit. Central unit by considering the reported price variables
solves a comprehensive joint power and codebook allocation problem for all of the players.
Consequently, by the conventional method, price variables are determined by players and power
and codebook are assigned centrally. In the following, the optimization problems which should
be solved by different players and the optimization problem which should be solved by the
central unit are presented. It should be noted that each InP can play the role of the central unit
to solve the comprehensive joint power and codebook allocation problem.
A. InP Optimization Problem
Each InP maximizes its utility function by considering minimum utilities ΦISP0 , Φ
User
0 and Φ
SDO
0
for ISPs, users and SDO, respectively. Moreover, for other InPs it considers minimum utility
ΦEInP0 . The corresponding optimization problem is formulated as:
max
ρ,p,L,α
ΦInPi , (31a)
s.t. : (5)-(12),
ΦISPtot ≥ ΦISP0 , (31b)
ΦUsertot ≥ ΦUser0 , (31c)
ΦInPi′ ≥ ΦEInP0 , i′ ∈ I/i, (31d)
ΦSDOtot ≥ ΦSDO0 . (31e)
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B. ISP Optimization Problem
Each ISP maximizes its utility function by considering minimum utilities ΦInP0 , Φ
User
0 and Φ
SDO
0
for InPs, users and SDO, respectively. Moreover, for other ISPs, each ISP considers minimum
utility ΦEISP0 . The corresponding optimization problem is formulated as:
max
ρ,p,L,α
ΦISPv , (32a)
s.t. : (5)-(12),
ΦInPtot ≥ ΦInP0 , (32b)
ΦUsertot ≥ ΦUser0 , (32c)
ΦISPv′ ≥ ΦEISP0 ,∀v′ ∈ V/v, (32d)
ΦSDOtot ≥ ΦSDO0 . (32e)
C. SDO Optimization Problem
SDO maximizes its utility function by considering minimum utilities ΦInP0 , Φ
User
0 and Φ
ISP
0 for
InPs, users, and ISPs, respectively. The corresponding optimization problem is formulated as:
max
ρ,p,L,α
ΦSDOtot , (33a)
s.t. : (5)-(12),
ΦInPtot ≥ ΦInP0 , (33b)
ΦUsertot ≥ ΦUser0 , (33c)
ΦISPtot ≥ ΦISP0 . (33d)
D. Central Unit Optimization Problem
As we mentioned, central unit by considering the reported prices, solves a joint power and
codebook allocation problem. Therefore, optimization problem which should be solved by the
central unit is presented as follows:
max
ρ,p,α
{ΦISPtot ,ΦInPtot ,ΦSenstot ,ΦUsertot }, s.t. : (5)-(12). (34)
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V. SOLUTION
A. Solution of the Weight-One Approach
In order to solve the optimization problem (30), the alternating algorithm is used [48]. Based
on the alternating method, in each iteration, each set of variables are calculated assuming other
variable sets are fixed.
The main solution steps are presented in Algorithm 1. In Step 2, the problem of finding L
is solved by assuming the other variables being fixed. This problem is a non-constrained linear
programming which can be solved by using the CVX toolbox [49]. The optimization problem
with variable L is formulated as follows:
max
L
∑
v∈V
ωISPv Φ
ISP
v +
∑
u∈U
ωUseru Φ
User
u (35)
+
∑
i∈I
ωInPi Φ
InP
i +
∑
i∈I
∑
bi∈Bi
∑
sbi∈Sbi
ωSenssbi
ΦSenssbi
.
In Step 3, with assumption of other optimization variables being fixed, the problem of finding
α is solved. By using the epigraph technique and relaxing the variable α to have the continuous
value between 0 and 1, the optimization problem (35) is reformulated as:
max
α,δ,β
∑
i∈I
∑
bi∈Bi
∑
sbi∈Sbi
ωSenssbi
(∑
v∈V
δv,sbiL
Sens,Data
v,sbi
+
∑
v∈V
∑
c′i∈UCi
δv,sbir
c′i
bi,sbi
LUp,Ratesbi
− βsbiCSens,Reservsbi
)
+
∑
v∈V
ωISPv
( ∑
u∈Kv
q log(1 +
I∑
i=1
∑
bi∈Bi
∑
sbi∈Sbi
αsbi ,u
I∑
i=1
∑
bi∈Bi
Sbi
)LReserv,Userv,u −
∑
sbi∈Sbi
δv,sbiL
Sens,Data
v,sbi
−
∑
i∈I
∑
bi∈Bi
∑
sbi∈Sbi
δv,sbir
c′i
bi,sbi
LUp,Ratesbi
)
+
∑
v∈V
∑
u∈Kv
ωUseru
(
q log(1 +
I∑
i=1
∑
bi∈Bi
∑
sbi∈Sbi
αsbi ,u
I∑
i=1
∑
bi∈Bi
Sbi
)
(CReserv,Useru − LReserv,Userv,u )
)
,
s.t. δv,sbi ≤
∑
u∈Kv
αsbi ,u, (36a)
δv,sbi ≤ 1, (36b)
βsbi ≤
∑
u∈U
αsbi ,u, (36c)
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Algorithm 1 ITERATIVE RESOURCE ALLOCATION ALGORITHM
• STEP1: Initialization:
– Set t = 0 (iteration number),
– Find α(0), P(0), L(0), and ρ(0)
• STEP2:
– Set P = P(t), α = α(t), and ρ = ρ(t),
– Solve the optimization problem with variable L,
– Set the result of optimization problem solution to L(t+ 1),
• STEP3:
– Set P = P(t), L = L(t+ 1), and ρ = ρ(t),
– Solve the optimization problem with variable α,
– Set the result of optimization problem solution to α(t+ 1),
• STEP4:
– Set L = L(t+ 1), α = α(t+ 1), and ρ = ρ(t),
– Solve the optimization problem with variable P,
– Set the result of optimization problem solution to P(t+ 1),
• STEP5:
– Set L = L(t+ 1), α = α(t+ 1), and P = P(t+ 1),
– Solve the optimization problem with variable ρ,
– Set the result of optimization problem solution to ρ(t+ 1),
• STEP6:
– If convergence
stop and return α, P, L, and ρ as the suboptimal solution,
– Else
set t = t+ 1 and go back to STEP 2,
– Output: Suboptimal value of α, P, L, and ρ.
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βsbi ≤ 1, (36d)
0 ≤ αsbi ,u ≤ 1, (36e)
where δ = [δv,sbi ] and β = [βsbi ] are the auxiliary variables corresponding to the epigraph
algorithm. The optimization problem (36) is convex which can be solved by applying the CVX
toolbox. The aim of Step 4 is finding p. The corresponding optimization problem is formulated
as:
max
p
∑
v∈V
ωISPv
(∑
i∈I
∑
bi∈Bi
∑
u∈Kv
∑
ci∈DCi
LDn,Ratev WSr
ci
bi,u
(37a)
−
∑
i∈I
∑
bi∈Bi
∑
u∈Kv
∑
ci∈DCi
LPower,BSbi ρ
ci
bi,u
pcibi,u−
∑
i∈I
∑
bi∈Bi
∑
sbi∈Sbi
min{
∑
u∈Kv
αsbi ,u, 1}r
c′i
bi,sbi
LUp,Ratesbi
)
−
∑
v∈V
∑
u∈Kv
ωUseru
(∑
i∈I
∑
bi∈Bi
∑
ci∈DCi
LDn,Ratev WSr
ci
bi,u
)
+
∑
i∈I
ωInPi
( ∑
bi∈Bi
∑
u∈U
∑
ci∈DCi
LPower,BSbi ρ
ci
bi,u
pcibi,u
)
+
∑
i∈I
∑
bi∈Bi
∑
sbi∈Sbi
ωSenssbi
(∑
v∈V
∑
c′i∈UCi
min{
∑
u∈Kv
αsbi ,u, 1}
r
c′i
bi,sbi
LUp,Ratesbi
−
∑
c′i∈UCi
ρ
c′i
bi,sbi
p
c′i
bi,sbi
CPower,Sup
)
,
s.t. (9)-(12).
Due to the non-convex rate function in uplink and downlink transmissions, the optimization
problem (37) is non-convex. To tackle the non-convexity issue of the considered problem, a
successive convex approximation (SCA) approach with difference of two concave functions
(D.C.) approximation method is used. In order to apply this method, at first the downlink rate
function is written as rcibi,u = f
ci
bi,u
− gcibi,u, where
f cibi,u = log2(ρ
ci
bi,u
∑
n∈Ni
qcin λ
bi
n,ci
pcibi,u|hnbi,u|2 + Icibi,u + (σcibi,u)2), (38)
gcibi,u = log2(I
ci
bi,u
+ (σcibi,u)
2). (39)
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By applying the D.C. approximation, we have
gcibi,u(p
BS,t) ≈ gcibi,u(pBS,t−1) +∇gcibi,u(pBS,t−1)(pBS,t − pBS,t−1), (40)
where
∇gcibi,u(pBS) =

0, ∀i′ 6= i,∑
n∈Ni ρ
ci
b′
i
,u′q
ci
n λ
b′i
n,ci
|hn
b′
i
,u
|2
ln(2)
(
I
ci
bi,u
+(σ
ci
bi,u
)2
) , ∀u′ 6= u, b′i 6= bi. (41)
The uplink data rate function is written as
r
c′i
bi,sbi
= f
′c′i
bi,sbi
− g′c′ibi,sbi , (42)
where
f
c′i
bi,sbi
= log2(ρ
′c′i
bi,sbi
∑
m∈Mi
q′mbi,sbiλ
′bi
n,c′i
p
′c′i
bi,sbi
|hmbi,sbi |
2 + I
′c′i
bi,sbi
+ (σ
′c′i
bi,sbi
)2), (43)
g
c′i
bi,sbi
= log2(I
′c′i
bi,sbi
+ (σ
′c′i
bi,sbi
)2). (44)
By applying the D.C. approximation, we have
g
c′i
bi,sbi
(pSens,t) ≈ gc′ibi,sbi (p
Sens,t−1) +∇gc′ibi,sbi (p
Sens,t−1)(pSens,t − pSens,t−1). (45)
where
∇gc′ibi,sbi (p
Sens) =

0, ∀i′ 6= i,∑
m∈Mi ρ
′c′i
b′
i
,s′
b′
i
q
c′i
mλ
′b′i
m,c′
i
|hm
bi,s
′
b′
i
|2
I
′c′
i
bi,sbi
+(σ
′c′
i
bi,sbi
)2
. b′i 6= bi.
(46)
By applying the D.C. approximation, the optimization problem (37) is approximated by a convex
function which can be solved by CVX toolbox. In Step 5, the problem of finding ρ is solved
which is an integer non-linear optimization problem. To solve it, we initially relax the integer
variables to continuous values between zero and one. The same steps that are applied in the
previous step are applied here as well.
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B. Solution of the Max-Min Approach
To solve the max-min approach optimization problem, at first we apply the epigraph method
as:
max
ρ,p,L,α,t
t+ ΦUsertot , (47a)
s.t. : (5)-(12),
ΦISPtot ≥ t, (47b)
ΦInPtot ≥ t, (47c)
ΦSenstot ≥ t,
where t is an auxiliary variable. Then, we continue similar to the weight-one approach algorithm.
C. Solution of the Conventional Approach Problems
Each of the presented optimization problem in the conventional approach can be solved by
the iterative algorithm shown in Algorithm 1.
In order to achieve and optimal solution of for the proposed optimization problem, the
monotonic optimization approach can be applied [50], [51] which needs some alterations in
the objective and constraints to convert the original problem into the standard form of the
monotonic optimization problems. However, in this paper, due to the space limitation and huge
computational complexity, we omit this approach in the paper.
VI. CONVERGENCE OF THE PROPOSED SOLUTION ALGORITHM
The alternating method exploits an iterative algorithm in which in each iteration each set of
variables is calculated by supposing that the other variable sets are fixed and process is continued
until convergence. The necessary and sufficient conditions to ensure the algorithm convergence is
that in each iteration the objective function increases or stays unaltered compared to the previous
iteration [52], [53]. In our solution, we have
· · · ≤ U(ρt,pt,Lt,αt) a≤ U(ρt,pt,Lt+1,αt) b≤ (48)
U(ρt,pt,Lt+1,αt+1)
c≤ U(ρt,pt+1,Lt+1,αt+1) d≤
U(ρt+1,pt+1,Lt+1,αt+1) ≤ . . .
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which indicates that after each iteration, the objective function increases or stays unaltered
compared to the previous iteration.
Inequality (a) in (48) follows from the fact that optimization problem with variables L and
constant ρ,p and α (ρ = ρt,p = pt,α = αt) is a linear program whose worst solution is
L = Lt, therefore, based on the worst solution, we have Lt+1 = Lt. Consequently, we have
U(ρt,pt,Lt,αt) ≤1 U(ρt,pt,Lt+1,αt). For inequalities (b), (c) and (d), the same argument as
for inequality (a) can be used. Since for a finite set of transmit powers and subcarrier assignment,
the summation of utilities is bounded, the procedure must converge.
VII. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
In this section, we investigate the computational complexity of the proposed methods. As
mentioned, we used Algorithm 1 to solve problem (28) in three different approaches. The
Algorithm has four stages which determine ρ, p, α and L. In all employed methods, we use
DC approximation to solve subcarrier and power allocation problems. The main computational
complexity for the DC approximation comes from solving the problem via CVX which applies
interior point method. Generally, the number of required iterations of interior point method is
log((∆)/t0%)
log(ξe)
where ∆ is the total number of constraints, t0 is initial point to approximated
the accuracy of interior point method, % is the stopping criterion and ξe is used to update the
accuracy of interior point method. CVX uses interior point method for variables α and L as ρ
and p. Hence, their required iterations are computed similar to ρ and p. Number of iterations in
all proposed methods differ in ∆. In Weight-One approach, total number of constraints due to
(5)-(12) equals Nρ = U
∑
i∈I Ci
∑
i∈I,i′ 6=iCi′
∑
i∈I Bi
∑
i∈I,i′ 6=iBi′ + U
∑
i∈I C
2
i Bi(Bi − 1) +∑
i∈I Ni +
∑
i∈IMi +
∑
i∈I Bi + 2S+U for subcarrier allocation and Np =
∑
i∈I Bi + 2S+U
for power allocation stages. Number of constraints of (36) and (35) determine ∆ of α and L,
respectively. In Max-Min approach, number of constrants of (47) is calculated for all variables. In
conventional approach, ∆ for variable L is calculated based on (31)-(33) and for other variables
∆ is determined from (34). All the number of constraints of these approaches are summarized
in Table II.
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TABLE II: Computational Complexity of Proposed Methods
Approach Variable ∆
ρ Nρ
Weight-One p Np
α S(2V + U + 2)
L 0
ρ Nρ + 3
Max-Min p Np + 3
α S(2V + U + 2) + 2
L 3
ρ Nρ + I + V + 9
Conventional p Np + I + V + 9
α S(2V + U + 2) + V + 7
L I + V + 9
VIII. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed end to end pricing and radio resource
allocation approach, we first depict the utility of each of the players versus various parameters.
Moreover, we compare the performance of the proposed approach to the conventional one. It is
worth to note that due to the large number of variables and run-time limitation, without loss of
generality, we present the numerical results for a few number of IoT users, base stations, and
sensors.
A. Parameters
The considered parameters for numerical results are summarized as follows: Pmax1i = 50 (Watts)
for all i ∈ I, Pmaxbi = 1 (Watts) for all i ∈ I and b ∈ {2, . . . , B}, I = 2, B = 2, V = 2,
RminUp,sbi
= 0.01 (bps/Hz) for all bi ∈ Bi, sbi ∈ Sbi , and RminDn,v = 0.1 (bps/Hz) for all v ∈ V , v ∈ Kv,
hnbi,u = x
n
bi,u
(Dbi,u)
ξ where ξ indicates the path loss exponent and ξ = −3, xnbi,u represents the
Rayleigh fading, and Dbi,u demonstrates the distance between user u and BS bi. Moreover, to
scale the price of the power, data of sensor, and user reservation of player, we define a parameter
as scale of player with value SF = 105. By defining this scale of player, the maximum and
minimum prices of each of the parameters is defined as follows: 0  LPower,BS  SF × Lmax,
March 8, 2019 DRAFT
24
3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7
LMax
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Ut
ilit
y
108
ISP
User
InP
Sens
Total
3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7
LMax
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
U
til
ity
108
ISP
User
InP
SDO
Total
Fig. 4: Left:Utility of each player in the max-min approach versus different values of Lmax. Right: Utility of each
player in the weight-one approach versus different values of Lmax.
0  LBW  Lmax, 0  LSens,Data  SF × Lmax, 0  LUp,Rate  Lmax, 0  LDn,Rate  Lmax and
0  LReserv,User  SF × Lmax where  denotes vector inequality or componentwise inequality.
Moreover, there are some common settings in the most of the results which are as follows: Sbi = 3
and the number of subcarriers for both of UL and DL transmission are set to 4. Furthermore,
we assume that each ISP serves 4 users.
B. Results
Figs. 4-Left, 4-Right, 5, respectively, depict the utility of all players in the max-min, weight-
one, and conventional approach versus different values of Lmax where the number of sensors is
set to 3. From these figures we can see that by increasing the utility (revenue) of InPs, ISPs,
and SDO, the total utility of the users is decreased. This is due to the fact that users are the end
consumer of the network and the other players income comes from their payments. Moreover,
as can be seen, the utility of InPs is more than that of the other players. This is because InPs
sell their resources to SDO and ISPs, simultaneously (see the details of pricing model of InPs
in n in Fig. 3).
Now using the results in the above figures we obtain Figs. 6-Right and 6-Left which depict
total revenue and fairness for the max-min, conventional, and weight-one methods.
In general, we look for a setting which has the best total revenue. However, such revenue has
to be divided in a fair fashion among the stakeholders. To quantify this fact, we exploit the Jain
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Fig. 5: Utility of each player in the conventional approach versus different values of Lmax.
fairness index [54]. The Jain fairness index for utilities of ISPs, InPs, and SDO is calculated as
follows [54]:
J(ΦISPtot ,Φ
InP
tot ,Φ
Sens
tot ) =
(ΦISPtot + Φ
InP
tot + Φ
Sens
tot )
2
3((ΦISPtot )2 + (Φ
InP
tot )2 + (Φ
Sens
tot )2)
. (49)
With the Jain fairness index, when ΦISPtot = Φ
InP
tot = Φ
Sens
tot , the best fairness (i.e., J(Φ
ISP
tot ,Φ
InP
tot ,Φ
Sens
tot ) =
1) is achieved.
As the figures show, if we go with the conventional approach, we are in fact cutting the
total revenue. Moreover, the degree of fairness is not also acceptable. By using the weight-one
approach, the total revenue is drastically increased. Nevertheless, the resulting fairness is still far
from being acceptable. Finally, if we use the max-min approach, we get close to the complete
fairness. This is while the total revenue is also increased compared to the conventional approach.
The results prove how the proposed end to end joint pricing and radio resource allocation
approach can provide fairness and at the same time, increase the revenue. This is achieved
through jointly optimizing the parameters corresponding to all players.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we provided a novel comprehensive pricing model for IoT services in 5G
networks. We considered all the parties involved in the communication scenario and determined
the revenue and cost of each party. We formulated the resource allocation in the considered
model as a multi-objective optimization problem where in addition to the resource allocation,
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Fig. 6: Left:Summation of players utilities for the proposed methods. Right: Fairness index for the proposed methods.
the pricing variables were also the optimization variables. We solved the resulting problem using
the alternating approach and evaluated the performance of the proposed model for different
network scenarios using simulations. Moreover, we presented the conventional approach for
pricing and radio resource allocation. Simulation results indicate that by applying the proposed
joint framework, we can increase the total revenue compared to the conventional case while
providing an almost complete fairness among the players. This paves the way to reach the stated
goal of the paper: removing one of the barriers that prevent IoT from becoming pervasive.
APPENDIX
Appendix A: Suppose that we have a multi-objective maximization problem with objective
functions F and G, and variable vector % formulated as follows:
max
%
{F (%), G(%)}, s.t. : C1-CK ,
where C1, . . . , CK are the constraints of the optimization problem. In order to solve (50), one
method is scalarization where the original multi-objective problem is transformed into a single
objective problem. There are various methods which transform the original problem into a
single objective optimization problem. Each single objective optimization problem gives a Pareto
optimal solution of the original multi-objective problem. Each of the solutions is determined by
a point in the Pareto solution set of the original problem. For example, Fig. 7 shows the Pareto
solution set of the maximization problem in which the bold line determines the Pareto boundary.
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Each of the points can be interpreted as the solution of a specific transformed single objective
optimization problem. Suppose that the weighted method is used to transfer the multi-objective
into a single objective problem. With the weighted method, the optimization problem (50) is
reformulated as
max
%
WF (%) + (1−W )G(%), s.t. : C1-CK . (50)
The weighted method is an approach of the scalarization method in which with different values
of W , various single objective optimization problem can be achieved. When the Pareto solution
set is a convex set, such as Fig. 7-Left, with the weighted method all of the points in the
Pareto boundary can be achieved. For example, point S1 can be interpreted as a weighted single
objective problem in which the weight of function F is W = 1. Point S2 can be interpreted
as a weighted single objective optimization problem in which the main goal is maximizing the
fairness between functions F and G. Point S3 can be interpreted as a weighted single objective
optimization problem in which the weight of function G is 1 or (W = 0). As we mentioned,
with the weighted approach, all points of the Pareto boundary of a convex Pareto solution set
can be achieved. However, finding a value of W which gives the best fairness between F and
G is so complicated, while by exploiting the max-min approach as
max
%
{min
F,G
{F (%), G(%)}}, s.t. : C1-CK , (51)
the best fairness can be easily achieved. Moreover, if the Pareto solution set not be a convex set,
such as Fig. 7-Right, the weighted approach can not achieve all of the Pareto boundary points. For
example, in Fig. 7-Right, point S2 (consider that S2 gives the best fairness) can not be achieved
with the weighted approach. In this case, the max-min method can be applied to achieve the best
fairness between F and G. From the above explanation, we can find that in a multi-objective
optimization problem, considering the main goal of the multi-objective optimization problem, a
single objective optimization problem can be formulated from the main multi-objective problem.
It should be noted that, in addition to the main goal of the transformed optimization problem, its
solution complexity can have essential role in selecting the form of the transformed optimization
problem. The proposed max-min approach comes from this fact that the fairness among ISPs,
SDO and InPs has the maximum values, and also, the utility function of users has the maximum
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F
G
F = G
S1
S2
S3
W = 1
W = 0
W = w
Pareto Boundary for Max-Max
F
G
F = GS1
S3
S4
Pareto Boundary for Max-Max
W = 1
S2
W = 0
W = w
Fig. 7: Left:Convex Pareto boundary of a multi-objective maximization problem with two objective functions. Right:
Non-convex Pareto boundary of a multi-objective maximization problem with two objective functions.
value. It should be noted that, due to the this fact that the user utility has a negative value, it is
not possible to consider it as an entry of the max-min approach.
REFERENCES
[1] A. Kamilaris and A. Pitsillides, “Mobile phone computing and the internet of things: A survey,” IEEE Internet of Things
Journal, vol. 3, no. 6, pp. 885–898, Dec 2016.
[2] S. Vashi, J. Ram, J. Modi, S. Verma, and C. Prakash, “in proc. internet of things (IoT): A vision, architectural elements,
and security issues,” in 2017 International Conference on I-SMAC (IoT in Social, Mobile, Analytics and Cloud) (I-SMAC),
Feb 2017, pp. 492–496.
[3] C. Liang and F. R. Yu, “Wireless network virtualization: A survey, some research issues and challenges,” IEEE
Communications Surveys Tutorials, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 358–380, Firstquarter 2015.
[4] D. Niyato, D. T. Hoang, N. C. Luong, P. Wang, D. I. Kim, and Z. Han, “Smart data pricing models for the internet of
things: a bundling strategy approach,” IEEE Network, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 18–25, Mar 2016.
[5] D. Niyato, M. A. Alsheikh, P. Wang, D. I. Kim, and Z. Han, “Market model and optimal pricing scheme of big data and
internet of things (IoT),” in Proc 2016 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC), May 2016, pp. 1–6.
[6] J. Denis, M. Pischella, and D. L. Ruyet, “Energy-efficiency-based resource allocation framework for cognitive radio
networks with fbmc/ofdm,” IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, vol. 66, no. 6, pp. 4997–5013, Jun. 2017.
[7] A. Sultana, L. Zhao, and X. Fernando, “Efficient resource allocation in device-to-device communication using cognitive
radio technology,” IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, vol. 66, no. 11, pp. 10 024–10 034, Nov 2017.
[8] D. T. Ngo, S. Khakurel, and T. Le-Ngoc, “Joint subchannel assignment and power allocation for OFDMA femtocell
networks,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 342–355, Jan. 2014.
DRAFT March 8, 2019
29
[9] J. Li, Q. Sun, and G. Fan, “Resource allocation for multiclass service in IoT uplink communications,” in Proc. 2016 3rd
International Conference on Systems and Informatics (ICSAI), Nov 2016, pp. 777–781.
[10] H. Kebriaei, B. Maham, and D. Niyato, “Bandwidth price optimization for D2D communications underlaying cellular
networks,” in Proc. IEEE WCNC’14, Apr. 2014, pp. 1608–1614.
[11] P. Li, S. Guo, and I. Stojmenovic, “A truthful double auction for device-to-device communications in cellular networks,”
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 71–81, Jan. 2016.
[12] C. Xu, L. Song, Z. Han, D. Li, and B. Jiao, “Resource allocation using a reverse iterative combinatorial auction for
device-to-device underlay cellular networks,” in Proc. IEEE GLOBECOM’12, Dec. 2012, pp. 4542–4547.
[13] C. Xu, L. Song, Z. Han, Q. Zhao, X. Wang, and B. Jiao, “Interference-aware resource allocation for device-to-device
communications as an underlay using sequential second price auction,” in Proc. IEEE ICC, 2012, pp. 445–449.
[14] C. Jiang, Y. Chen, K. R. Liu, and Y. Ren, “Network economics in cognitive networks,” IEEE Communications Magazine,
vol. 53, no. 5, pp. 75–81, May 2015.
[15] Y. Xing, R. Chandramouli, and C. Cordeiro, “Price dynamics in competitive agile spectrum access markets,” IEEE Journal
on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 613–621, Apr. 2007.
[16] O. Ileri, D. Samardzija, T. Sizer, and N. B. Mandayam, “Demand responsive pricing and competitive spectrum allocation
via a spectrum server,” in Proc. IEEE DySPAN05, Nov. 2005, pp. 194–202.
[17] D. Niyato and E. Hossain, “Competitive pricing for spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks: Dynamic game,
inefficiency of nash equilibrium, and collusion,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 26, no. 1,
pp. 192–202, Jan. 2008.
[18] S. Gandhi, C. Buragohain, L. Cao, H. Zheng, and S. Suri, “A general framework for wireless spectrum auctions,” in Proc.
IEEE DySPAN’07, Apr. 2007, pp. 22–33.
[19] D. Niyato and E. Hossain, “Hierarchical spectrum sharing in cognitive radio: A microeconomic approach,” in Proc. IEEE
WCNC’07, Mar. 2007, pp. 3822–3826.
[20] O. Simeone, I. Stanojev, S. Savazzi, Y. Bar-Ness, U. Spagnolini, and R. Pickholtz, “Spectrum leasing to cooperating
secondary ad hoc networks,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 203–213, Jan. 2008.
[21] D. Niyato and E. Hossain, “Market equilibrium, competitive, and cooperative pricing for spectrum sharing in cognitive
radio networks: analysis and comparison,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 7, no. 11, pp. 4273–4283,
Nov. 2008.
[22] H. Sartono, Y. H. Chew, W. H. Chin, and C. Yuen, “Joint demand and supply auction pricing strategy in dynamic spectrum
sharing,” in Proc. IEEE PIMRC, Sep. 2009, pp. 833–837.
[23] C. Jiang, Y. Chen, K. R. Liu, and Y. Ren, “Optimal pricing strategy for operators in cognitive femtocell networks,” IEEE
Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 13, no. 9, pp. 5288–5301, Sep. 2014.
[24] D. Niyato and E. Hossain, “Wireless broadband access: WiMax and beyond-integration of WiMax and WiFi: Optimal
pricing for bandwidth sharing,” IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 45, no. 5, pp. 140–146, May 2007.
[25] S.-Y. Yun, Y. Yi, D.-H. Cho, and J. Mo, “The economic effects of sharing femtocells,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas
in Communications, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 595–606, Apr. 2012.
[26] X. Kang, R. Zhang, and M. Motani, “Price-based resource allocation for spectrum-sharing femtocell networks: A stackelberg
game approach,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 538–549, Apr. 2012.
[27] N. Shetty, S. Parekh, and J. Walrand, “Economics of femtocells,” in Proc. IEEE GLOBECOM’09, Dec. 2009, pp. 1–6.
March 8, 2019 DRAFT
30
[28] L. Duan, J. Huang, and B. Shou, “Economics of femtocell service provision,” IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing,
vol. 12, no. 11, pp. 2261–2273, Nov. 2013.
[29] Y. Yi, J. Zhang, Q. Zhang, and T. Jiang, “Spectrum leasing to femto service provider with hybrid access,” in Proc. IEEE
INFOCOM’12, Mar. 2012, pp. 1215–1223.
[30] Y. Chen, J. Zhang, and Q. Zhang, “Utility-aware refunding framework for hybrid access femtocell network,” IEEE
Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 11, no. 5, pp. 1688–1697, May 2012.
[31] K. Zhu, E. Hossain, and D. Niyato, “Pricing, spectrum sharing, and service selection in two-tier small cell networks: A
hierarchical dynamic game approach,” IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 13, no. 8, pp. 1843–1856, Aug. 2014.
[32] J. Wang, C. Jiang, Z. Bie, T. Q. Quek, and Y. Ren, “Mobile data transactions in device-to-device communication networks:
pricing and auction,” IEEE Communications Letters, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 300–303, Jun. 2016.
[33] Q. Xu, Y. Chen, and K. J. R. Liu, “Optimal pricing for interference control in time-reversal device-to-device uplinks,” in
Proc. IEEE GlobalSIP, 2015, pp. 1096–1100.
[34] D. Yang, X. Fang, and G. Xue, “Truthful auction for cooperative communications,” in Proc. ACM International Symposium
on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing, 2011, pp. 1–10.
[35] D. Niyato, D. T. Hoang, N. C. Luong, P. Wang, D. I. Kim, and Z. Han, “Smart data pricing models for the internet of
things: a bundling strategy approach,” IEEE Network, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 18–25, Apr.-Mar. 2016.
[36] D. Niyato, M. A. Alsheikh, P. Wang, D. I. Kim, and Z. Han, “Market model and optimal pricing scheme of big data and
internet of things (IoT),” arXiv preprint arXiv:1602.03202, 2016.
[37] D. Niyato, P. Wang, and D. I. Kim, “Optimal service auction for wireless powered internet of things (IoT) device,” in
Proc IEEE GLOBECOM’15, 2015, pp. 1–6.
[38] A. E. Al-Fagih, F. M. Al-Turjman, W. M. Alsalih, and H. S. Hassanein, “A priced public sensing framework for
heterogeneous IoT architectures,” IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 133–147,
Jun. 2013.
[39] M. J. Farooq and Q. Zhu, “Adaptive and resilient revenue maximizing dynamic resource allocation and pricing for cloud-
enabled iot systems,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1707.08691v3, 2018.
[40] A. Kiani and N. Ansari, “Towards hierarchical mobile edge computing: An auction-based profit maximization approach,”
IEEE Internet of Things Journal, vol. 4, pp. 2082–2091, Dec.2 017.
[41] H. Zhang, Y. Xiao, S. Bu, D. Niyato, F. R. Yu, and Z. Han, “Computing resource allocation in three-tier IoT Fog networks:
A joint optimization approach combining stackelberg game and matching,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal, vol. 4, no. 5,
pp. 1204–1215, Oct 2017.
[42] H. Nikopour and H. Baligh, “Sparse code multiple access,” in Proc. 2013 IEEE 24th Annual International Symposium on
Personal, Indoor, and Mobile Radio Communications (PIMRC), Sept 2013, pp. 332–336.
[43] S. Zhang, X. Xu, L. Lu, Y. Wu, G. He, and Y. Chen, “Sparse code multiple access: An energy efficient uplink approach
for 5G wireless systems,” in Proc. 2014 IEEE Global Communications Conference, Dec 2014, pp. 4782–4787.
[44] M. Moltafet, N. M. Yamchi, M. R. Javan, and P. Azmi, “Comparison study between PD-NOMA and SCMA,” IEEE
Transactions on Vehicular Technology, vol. 67, no. 2, pp. 1830–1834, Feb 2018.
[45] J. H. Cho, Y. Wang, I. R. Chen, K. S. Chan, and A. Swami, “A survey on modeling and optimizing multi-objective
systems,” IEEE Communications Surveys Tutorials, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 1867–1901, thirdquarter 2017.
[46] K. Deb, “Solving goal programming problems using multi-objective genetic algorithms,” in Proc. Congress on Evolutionary
Computation-CEC99 (Cat. No. 99TH8406), vol. 1, 1999, p. 84 Vol. 1.
DRAFT March 8, 2019
31
[47] E. Bjornson, E. A. Jorswieck, M. Debbah, and B. Ottersten, “Multiobjective signal processing optimization: The way to
balance conflicting metrics in 5G systems,” IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 14–23, Nov 2014.
[48] R. Hooke and T. A. Jeeves, “Direct search solution of numerical and statistical problems,” Journal of the ACM (JACM),
vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 212–229, 1961.
[49] I. C. Research, “CVX: Matlab software for disciplined convex programming,” http://cvxr.com/cvx, Aug 2012.
[50] A. Zappone, E. Bjrnson, L. Sanguinetti, and E. Jorswieck, “A framework for globally optimal energy-efficient resource
allocation in wireless networks,” in 2016 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing
(ICASSP), March 2016, pp. 3616–3620.
[51] ——, “Globally optimal energy-efficient power control and receiver design in wireless networks,” IEEE Transactions on
Signal Processing, vol. 65, no. 11, pp. 2844–2859, June 2017.
[52] L. Venturino, N. Prasad, and X. Wang, “Coordinated scheduling and power allocation in downlink multicell OFDMA
networks,” IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, vol. 58, no. 6, pp. 2835–2848, July 2009.
[53] R. C. de Lamare and R. Sampaio-Neto, “Adaptive reduced-rank equalization algorithms based on alternating optimization
design techniques for mimo systems,” IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, vol. 60, no. 6, pp. 2482–2494, July
2011.
[54] A. B. Sediq, R. H. Gohary, R. Schoenen, and H. Yanikomeroglu, “Optimal tradeoff between sum-rate efficiency and jain’s
fairness index in resource allocation,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 12, no. 7, pp. 3496–3509, July
2013.
March 8, 2019 DRAFT
